W. M. Barnes Company, A Corporation v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, A Corporation, Formerly Sohio Petroleum Company, A Corporation : Respondent\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
W. M. Barnes Company, A Corporation v. Sohio
Natural Resources Company, A Corporation,
Formerly Sohio Petroleum Company, A
Corporation : Respondent's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Duane A. Frandsen & MICHAEL A. HARRISON; Attorneys
for AppellantJOHN PRESTON CREER, KENT B. SCOTT, RICHARD G. ALLEN; Attorneys for
Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, W.M. Barnes v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., No. 16454 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1748
I 
I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH· 
W. M. BARNES COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
SOHIO NATURAL RESOURCES 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
formerly SOHIO PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, a Corporation 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16454 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fourth District Court for Uintah County 
Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN & 
MICHAEL A. HARRISON 
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen 
Professional Building 
90 West 1st North 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JOHN PRESTON CREER 
RICHARD G. ALLEN 
BRENT D. WARD 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84!11 
Attorneys for Respondent 
·-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W. M. BARNES COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
SOHIO NATURAL RESOURCES 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
formerly SOHIO PETROLEUM 
COMPANY, a Corporation 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16454 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fourth District Court for Uintah County 
Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN & 
MICHAEL A. HARRISON 
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen 
Professional Buildina 
90 West 1st North " 
Price, Utah 84501 l AHornoy; f°' App•ll~t 
JOHN PRESTON CREER 
RICHARD G. ALLEN 
BRENT D. WARD 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS FULLY 
CONSIDERED AND COMPORTS WITH ALL 
REQUIREMENTS OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT . 
THE CONVEYANCE AND ASSIGNMENT FROM 
BARNES TO SOHIO WAS AN ABSOLUTE DEED 
AND THE TRANSACTION WAS A SALE . . . 
A. 
B. 
c. 
It is Clear from the Deed Itself 
that the Transaction Between 
Barnes and Sohio was a Sale . 
Construing the Deed Together 
With the Letter Agreement and 
the Escrow Agreement Clearly and 
Unambiguously Evidences the 
Transaction Between Barnes and 
Sohio to be a Sale . . . . . . . . . · 
The Presumption that the 
Transaction was a Sale Can Only 
Be Overcome By Clear, Unequivocal, 
and Convincing Evidence Which 
Proves that Both Parties Intended 
a Mortgage . . . . . . . . . . · · · · 
i 
11 
11 i 
12 
( 
I ll I 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
D. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(cont.) 
The Acts of the Parties Confirm 
that the Transaction was a Sale 
Rather Than a Mortgage 
III. SINCE THERE WAS NO INDEBTEDNESS ON 
THE PART OF BARNES TO SOHIO, THE 
TRANSACTION CANNOT BE DEEMED TO BE 
A MORTGAGE . . . . . . . . . 
IV. SINCE THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR 
REDEMPTION, THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN 
BARNES AND SOHIO WAS A SALE . . . . 
V. EVEN IF THE DEED COULD BE CONSTRUED 
TO BE A MORTGAGE, THE PRESENT 
AC'rION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE 
Page No. 
15 
18 
20 
OF LACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
VI. THE CASES CITED BY BARNES DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE PRESENCE OF TRIABLE 
FACTS OR THE EXISTENCE OF A 
MORTGAGE IN THIS CASE 23 
CONCLUSION . . . . 30 
ii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-3-119 
Allen's Products Co. v. Glover, 414 P.2d 93 
(Utah 1966) • . . • . ..•• 
Brown v. Skeen, 58 P.2d 24 (Utah 1936) . 
Chambers v. Emery, 45 P. 192 (Utah 1896) 
Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940 (Utah 
19 3 3) • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Duerden v. Solomon, 94 P. 978 (Utah 
1908) . • • . . 
Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 
(Utah 1960} •... 
Ewing v. Keith, 52 P. 41 (Utah 1898} 
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1962} . . . . 
Gibbons v. Gibbons, 135 P.2d 105 
(Utah 1943} 
Hallstrom v. Buhler, 378 P.2d 355 
(Utah 1963) ..... 
Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 
(Utah 1975) ..... 
iii 
Page No. 
12 
12 
12 
10 
13,23,26 
14 
13,25,26 
23,24 
9 
13 
9 
20,27,28 
20,29 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
(ContTriUed) 
Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc., 355 
P.2d 973 (Utah 1960) ••.• 
Hess v. Anger, 177 P. 232 
(Utah 1918) ••••. 
Ideal Electric Co. v. Willie, 435 
P.2d 921 (Utah 1968) 
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 
(Utah 1976) ••.•• 
Page No. 
9 
25 
14 
14,21 
Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 
(Utah 1972) •••.• . .•••• 14,28,29 
Larsen v. Christensen, 443 P.2d 
402 (Utah 1968) •••.•• 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., 248 P. 2d 692 (Utah 1952) • 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1976) ..••. 
Rizo v. MacBeth, 398 P.2d 209 (Alas. 
1965) . . . . . . . • . ...•. 
Smyth v. Reed, 78 P. 478 (Utah 1904) 
Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 636 
(Utah 1932) • • • • • . • • • • • • 
Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey, 
143 P.2d 283 (Utah 1943) •••••. 
iv 
8,9 
14 
8,9 
14 
12,14,19 
13,19 
14,15,17,19,27 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
__,,, 
I 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
I Other Authorities 
Page No. 
IV American Law of Property 83,92 ... 19 
55 Am.Jur.2d, Mortgages 37, pp. 218 19 • 21 
Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.) 19 
Powell on Real Property, 1027-30, 1010-11 (Single 
Vol. Ed. 1968) . . . . . . . . 12 
3 Powell on Real Property,paragraph 447 (1977) . . 14 
v 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action in which plaintiff-appellant 
and defendant-respondent each seek to quiet title in themselves 
to certain real property located in Uintah County, State of 
Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 31, 1979, the Honorable George E. Ballif 
entered a preliminary ruling granting defendant-respondent's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. In 
its ruling, the court held that there were no "issues of 
material facts" presented by the pleadings, exhibits, 
affidavits, depositions, and other documents submitted. (R. 
144) • The ruling was based upon the court's conclusion that 
the transaction between the parties was a sale and not a 
mortgage. (R.144) 
The court stayed entry of an order pending an oral 
hearing and invited plaintiff-appellant to submit "additional 
affidavits or objections to any of the evidence the court has 
considered." (R. 145) In the two and one-half month interim 
between the court's preliminary ruling and oral argument 
plaintiff-appellant failed to produce any additional exhibits, 
affidavits, documents, or depositions, and offered no 
objections to the facts in the record. 
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On February 16, 1979, the court issued a further 
ruling concluding that summary judgment should be granted in 
favor of defendant-respondent. On April 2, 1979, the court 
entered its final order granting defendant-respondent's motion 
for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint and quieting 
title in defendant-respondent. (R.154-55). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent seeks a decision of this court 
affirming the order of the district court granting summary 
judgment in its favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 28, 1977, plaintiff-appellant, w. M. 
Barnes Company (hereinafter "Barnes"), filed a complaint 
against respondent, Sohio Natural Resources Company 
(hereinafter "Sohio"), seeking to quiet title in certain real 
property located in Uintah County, Utah. The property 
comprises approximately 5, 000 acres of mining leases, patented 
and unpatented mining claims and water rights in what is known 
as the Asphalt Ridge (hereinafter "Asphalt Ridge"). Sohio 
thereafter counterclaimed to quiet its title in the same 
property. 
-2-
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As of October 6, 1971, the property was owned by 
Barnes (37 1/2 percent), City Investing, Inc. (18 3/4 percent), 
Tarinc, S.A., a Panama corporation (18 3/4 percent), and Sohio 
(25 percent). (R. 70-78). 
On that day, all four owners entered into an operating 
agreement in Cleveland, Ohio, designating Sohio as operator of 
Asphalt Ridge. (R.70-78) Contrary to the statement in Barnes' 
brief, this agreement specifically provided that it did not 
create a trust relationship between the parties. (R. 75). 
While in Cleveland, Mr. w. M. Barnes (hereinafter 
"Mr. Barnes"), President of Barnes, also sought to borrow 
$500,000 from Sohio for use in a venture unrelated to Asphalt 
Ridge. Mr. Harry Pforzheimer, Vice-President of Sohio, 
informed Mr. Barnes that Sohio was not in the lending 
business. (R. 42: 29; R. 100). However, Mr. Pforzheimer 
stated that Sohio was interested in purchasing Barnes' interest 
in Asphalt Ridge and that an agreement to do so might assist 
Mr. Barnes in obtaining a loan of the money he needed from a 
bank. (R. 42:28-29; R. 100). 
On the strength of Sohio's agreement to buy Barnes' 
interest for $500,000, the National City Bank of Cleveland 
(hereinafter "Bank") agreed to loan Barnes $500,000. If Barnes 
defaulted on its promissory note with the Bank, Sohio was 
obligated to purchase Barnes' interest and remit the purchase 
price to the Bank. (R. 43 :D-3; 90). The transaction 
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became embodied in two agreements, each dated October 7, i 971 
involving Barnes, Sohio and the Bank, as escrow agent. The 
first agreement was a letter agreement between Sohio and a I 
arnes 
which contained an irrevocable promise by Sohio to purchase 
Barnes' interest in Asphalt Ridge for $500,000. (R. 43 :D-2; 
79-80). 
The letter agreement provided (1) that Barnes could 
elect to sell its interest to Sohio for $500,000 at any time 
between October 7, 1971 and March 7, 1973; and (2) that Sohio 
would have a first right of refusal if Barnes received another 
offer on the property. In that event, Barnes would 
notify Sohio in writing of the complete 
consideration offered and the identity 
of the offeror, whereupon Sohio shall 
have a period of thirty (30) days in 
which to advise Barnes in writing 
whether it wishes to purchase Barnes' 
interest upon the terms and conditions 
of said offer. (R. 43:0-2; 79-80). 
Mr. Pforzheimer, Mr. Barnes and an officer of the Bank 
executed an Escrow Agreement in conjunction with the letter 
agreement. (R. 43 :D-3; 89-92). The Escrow Agreement provided 
for the execution of a deed, entitled a "Conveyance and 
Assignment", by Barnes conveying Barnes' 37-1/2 percent 
undivided interest in Asphalt Ridge to Sohio. (R. 43: D-13; 
85-88) This deed was executed by Barnes on October 7, 1971, 
and was deposited in escrow with the Bank. 
Paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement outlined the terms 
of a sale of Barnes' Interest to occur upon Barne's failure~ 
pay the note to the Bank: 
In the event Borrower (Barnes] 
fails to pay, on or before 
December 29, 1972, its indebted-
-4-
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ness to Escrow Agent [Bank] in 
the amount of Five Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($500,000) 
together with all interest 
accrued thereupon, it shall 
be deemed that Borrower has 
elected to sell to Offeror 
[Sohio] the properties 
described in the said Letter 
of Commitment [letter agreement] 
and Borrower hereby authorizes 
and directs Escrow Agent 
to notify Offeror not later than 
January 5, 1973 that Borrower 
has elected to sell to Offeror, 
whereupon Of feror shall be 
obligated as of delivery of 
said notice by Escrow Agent 
to purchase the properties 
and pay Escrow Agent interest 
on said indebtedness from 
December 29, 1972 at the rate 
of eight percent (8%) per annum 
calculated on a 360 day basis. 
(R. 43:D-3; 90). 
The Bank then loaned Barnes $500,000 on a promissory 
note due and payable on December 29, 1972. Mr. Barnes, who was 
experienced in borrowing amounts of this magnitude, has since 
admitted that he understood these documents and was not acting 
under any duress: 
Q. So basically, your answer is that 
you knew what you were signing and under no 
duress when you signed it and made the 
agreement? 
A. Right. 
(R. 42:33). 
Q. Mr. Barnes, this kind of thing 
though was not new to you, borrowing from 
banks? 
A. Being in business, no, we had 
borrowed this kind of money many times. 
(R. 42:36). 
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""' 
In November, 19 7 2, the Bank sent Barnes a m t · a uri ty 
notice stating that the entire balance on the note plus 
interest was due December 29, 1972. (R. 43:D-14; 95). on the 
latter date, Mr. Barnes telephoned the Bank to ask for a 
thirty-day extension of time for payment. Because of the terms 
of paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement, the Bank was unable to 
grant the requested extension. Barnes' failure to repay the 
loan on December 29, 197 2 triggered the sale of Asphalt Ridge 
to Sohio. 
In letters dated January 2 and 4, 1973, the Bank 
advised Sohio and Barnes, respectively, that Barnes' failure to 
retire the note on December 29, 1972 constituted an election by 
Barnes sell the property to Sohio and that the Bank would 
deliver the deed to Sohio upon payment of the purchase pr ice. 
(R. 43:0-8; 96-97). 
On January 2, 1973, pursuant to the Escrow Agreement, 
Sohio paid the Bank $500,000 plus the accrued interest on 
Barnes' note and received the deed. Sohio later sold sixty 
percent (60%) of Barnes' former interest in Asphalt Ridge to 
other investors for sixty percent (60%) of the purchase price, 
or $300,000. (R. 102, 106). 
In his telephone conversations with representatives of 
Sohio and the Bank on December 29, 1972, and in the letter to 
Sohio bearing the same date, Mr. Barnes, for the first time, 
spoke of an offer to purchase Barnes' interest in Asphalt Ridge 
which he claimed to have received from a company called 
Prudential Fund. (R. 42:52-54; 43:D-9; 111). Barnes tried to 
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persuade the Bank to grant a thirty-day extension on the 
promissory note in order to allow Sohio the thirty days 
required by the letter agreement in which to exercise its first 
right of refusal. By Mr. Barnes' own admission, however, 
until late in the day on December 29, 1972, at no time had he 
made any attempt to tell Sohio or the Bank about another offer 
to purchase. (R.2; 42:53-54 43:0-9; 111; 114). Such notice did 
not come in time to allow Sohio the requisite thirty days to 
consider the offer prior to the due date of the note. The note 
went into default; Sohio purchased Barnes' interest and the 
late notice was without legal effect. 
In other correspondence between Barnes and Sabio 
during January, 1973, Mr. Barnes expressed his unhappiness that 
the Bank had not extended the term of the note and that Sohio 
had not allowed Barnes a "grace period" before purchasing the 
property. (R. 43:0-11; 114) Barnes made no mention of any 
"mortgage" or "pledge". Sohio repeated its position that at 
all times its intention had been to abide strictly by the terms 
of the letter agreement, Escrow Agreement, and deed. (R. 
43 :D-12; 116-17) • 
Although Barnes now claims that it "mortgaged", rather 
than sold, Asphalt Ridge, it was not until December, 1977, when 
this suit was filed, that Barnes took any further interest in 
the property. (R.103). Barnes made no attempt to complete the 
sale to the purported offeror, Prudential, after Sohio acquired 
the deed. (R. 42: 62-63, 71-72). Although Barnes knew that 
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work was being performed on the property during the five 
ensuing years at substantial expense to Sohio and others, 
Barnes did not object or participate in those activities or 
offer to pay for any share thereof. Although Barnes had 
previously paid its share of development expenditures, 
assessment costs, and taxes on the property, it paid for 
nothing after December 29, 1972. (R. 103, 110, 122). 
Not until late 1977, when Sohio sought Mr. Barnes' 
acknowledgement of the deed, did Barnes exhibit any interest in 
the property. 
thereafter. 1 
(R. 103). This suit was filed by Barnes shortly 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION WAS FULLY 
CONSIDERED AND COMPORTS WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The basic and controlling consideration in a summary 
judgment proceeding is to look beyond, search out, and pierce 
the pleadings to determine whether a genuine issue of materitl 
fact exists between the parties. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 
1266, 1267-68 (Utah 1976) ~ Larsen v. Christensen, 443 P.2d 
1 Mr. Barnes has since acknowledged the deed in sworn 
testimony. (R.42:67). Contrary to what Mr. Barnes says, ~here 
is no evidence in the record that Sohio has not recor~e~ i~f 
deed. The deed was, in fact, recorded prior to the filing 
this action. 
-8-
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402, 403 (Utah 1968); Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 636 (Utah 
1960) • 
The submissions, i.e., affidavits, documents, 
depositions, and pleadings are to be carefully considered by 
the court in the light most favorable to the losing party. !li.£!l 
v. McGovern, supra at 1268; Larsen v. Christensen, supra at 
403. When all the evidence, considered as a whole, fails to 
establish a genuine issue as to any material fact, or any right 
of recovery, it is incumbent upon the court to grant the motion 
for summary judgment. Larsen v. Christensen, supra at 403. 
Summary judgment 
• . • does have a useful and salu-
tary purpose. When the evidence as 
contended by the plaintiff, and 
every reasonable inference that 
fairly could be drawn therefrom, 
are considered in the light most 
favorable to him, and it neverthe-
less appears that he could establish 
no right to recovery, the motion 
should be granted to save the time, 
trouble and expense involved in a 
trial. 
Henri v. Washiki Club, Inc., 355 P.2d 973, at 973 (Utah 1960). 
See also Harvei v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905, 907 (Utah 1975); 
Frederick Mai & Co. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1962). 
The lower court's decision to grant Sohio's motion for 
summary judgment was carefully and deliberately considered. On 
October 31, 1978, the court indicated a preliminary intention 
to grant summary judgment, but stayed entry of an order until 
Barnes could provide additional submissions and objections, if 
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any, and be heard. Barnes offered no further affidavits, 
interrogatories, depositions, documents, or objections and on 
January 12, 1979, two and one-half months later, the court 
heard oral argument on Sohio's motion. On February 16, 1979, 
the court issued a further ruling restating that Sohio's mot~ 
should be granted. The court concluded that the instrumentof 
sale in this case 
. . . would not as a matter of law 
permit an interpretation of 
the transaction as a security 
transaction contemplating fore-
closure, rather than one of 
purchase as is expressly provided 
in the instrument. (R. 152). 
The actual order granting summary judgment and 
dismissing the case was signed by Judge Ballif on April 2, 
1979. 
In its brief, Barnes asserts that summary judgment is a 
harsh remedy and should be granted with caution. Caution was 
the byword of the lower court in this case. It is clear that 
the court concluded, as did this court in Allen's Products~. 
v. Glover, 414 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1966), that 
(t] he trial judge not only can but should gra~t a 
motion for summary judgment if he feels certain 
that he would rule that way no matter what proof 
a party could produce in support of his 
contentions. 
-10-
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After oral argument and a second look at the 
undisputed facts of this case, the court below held that no 
material facts were genuinely in dispute and that Barnes was 
not entitled to the relief sought in the complaint. This court 
should affirm the summary judgment quieting title in Sohio. 
II. 
THE CONVEYANCE AND ASSIGNMENT FROM BARNES TO 
SOHIO WAS AN ABSOLUTE DEED AND THE 
TRANSACTION WAS A SALE. 
A. It is clear from the deed itself that the 
transaction between Barnes and Sohio was a sale. The deed 
executed by Barnes on October 7, 1971, was entitled 
"Conveyance and Assignment," and contained the following 
language: 
For valuable consideration • 
w. M. Barnes Company ••. 
does hereby convey, assign, 
transfer, set over, release, 
and quitclaim unto Sohio Petroleum 
Company .•. all of its right, 
title and interest in and to all 
mining leases, patented and un-
patented mining claims and water 
rights located in the Asphalt 
Ridge project. (R. 85). 
Attached to the deed was a complete description of the 
Property conveyed. 
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The deed by Barnes conforms with the requirements ~r 
a deed found at Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13. See also Powell or 
----=...:;:; 
Real Property 1010-11 (Single Vol. Ed. 1968). Even in the 
absence of acknowledgment or proof, it is clear that the deed 
1 
is valid and binding between Barnes and Sohio. Utah Code Ann. .1 
' 57-1-6. 
The deed was deposited in escrow to be delivered to Sohio I 
upon the occurrence of any of the conditions set forth in the 
1
. 
letter agreement or Escrow Agreement. Such a conditional 
delivery is entirely appropriate. See Powell, supra at I 
1029-30. The date the condition occurs is the date of delincy I 
and the deed becomes effective and binding on that date (in . 
this case January 2, 1973). See Powell, supra at 1029-30. 
Barnes does not contend that the deed is deficient in 
any respect and the deed should be given the effect it was 
intended to have by its own clear and unequivocal terms. 
B. Construing the deed together with the letter 
agreement and the Escrow Agreement clearly and unambiguously 
evidences the transaction between Barnes and Sohio to be a 
~ It is clear that different instruments executed at the 
same time are to be read together in order to ascertain the 
intent of the parties at the time the deed was executed. ~ 
Smyth v. Reed, 78 P.478, 479 (Utah 1904). See also Utah Code 
§70A-3-119. The instruments executed along with the 
deed in the instant case include the letter agreement and the 
Escrow Agreement. Construed together, it is clear that these 
instruments effected a sale of Barnes' interest in Asphalt 
-12-
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Ridge to take place upon the occurrence of the following 
events: (1) Barnes' failure to pay its indebtedness to the Bank 
on or before December 29, 1972; followed by (2) Sohio's payment 
of $500,000, plus interest, to the Bank. It is by the 
occurrence of these events that the sale between Barnes and 
Sohio actually took place, as required by the deed, the letter 
agreement and paragraph 2 of the Escrow Agreement. (R. 43:0-3; 
79-80; 85, 90). Barnes' failure to pay the Bank constituted an 
election by Barnes to sell and Sohio proceeded to acquire 
Barnes' interest in the properties. Sohio paid the purchase 
price to the Bank, as escrow agent, and the Bank delivered the 
deed to Sohio. 
None of the terms in the deed, Escrow Agreement, or 
letter agreement reveal or imply any intention by either party 
to enter into a mortgage. Considered together, the terms of 
these instruments are not ambiguous and extrinsic evidence may 
not be resorted to in order to vary them. See Brown v. Skeen, 
58 P.2d 24, 32 (Utah 1936); Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 946 
(Utah 1933); Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 
1932) • 
C. The presumption that the transaction was a sale 
can only be overcome by clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence which proves that both parties intended a mortgage. 
The language of the deed speaks as an absolute conveyance. 
There arises, therefore, a strong presumption that the 
written terms express the intention of the parties. In 
the case of Ewing v. Keith, 52 P.4, 5 (Utah 1898) the 
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Utah Supreme Court made it clear that in an action to 
declare a deed to be a mortgage 
the burden rests on the moving 
party to overcome the strong presumption 
arising from the terms of the written 
instrument, by clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing testimony; and if there is 
a failure to overcome this presumption 
by testimony clear, plain and 
convincing, beyond any reasonable 
controversy, the written instrument 
will be held to express the intention 
of the parties. 
See also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 158 
(Utah 1976); Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey, 
143 P.283, 287 (Utah 1943); Smyth v. Reed, supra; Chambersv. 
Emery, 45 P. 192, 195 (Utah 1896) 3 Powell on 
Real Property p.447 (1977) .Furthermore, a deed may not be 
considered a mortgage unless and until it can be shown that 
both parties regarded it as a mortgage. In Northcrest, Inc. v. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1952), this 
court stated: 
Plaintiff maintains further that 
whether an instrument is a deed or 
mortgage is a matter of the 
intention of the parties, and that 
it must appear not only that one 
but both parties regarded it as a 
mortgage before it is such legally. 
There is no doubt that this is so. 
(Emphasis added). 
See also Ideal Electric Co. v. Willey, 435 P.2d 921, 923 (Ut~ 
1968); Rizo v. MacBeth, 398 P.2d 209, 212 (Alas. 1965) cited 
with approval in Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972). 
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In the instant case, there is nothing on the face of 
the documents which lends itself to a mortgage construction. 
Moreover, it is abundantly clear that Sohio has never 
considered the transaction to be a mortgage. From the very 
beginning Mr. Pforzheimer, Vice President of Sohio, indicated 
to Barnes that Sohio wanted to purchase the Asphalt Ridge 
property. Sohio has always acted consistent with that 
intention. Barnes has never suggested, let alone offered any 
proof of, the contrary. Therefore, even assuming Barnes' 
secret intention was as Mr. Barnes now states it to be, as a 
matter of law, the necessary union of intention to regard the 
transaction as a mortgage cannot be proved. 
Based upon the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits on 
file herein, it is apparent that even if a sale were not clear 
from the terms of the documents, the transaction was a sale 
based upon Barnes failure to allege facts sufficient to 
establish a mortgage. 
D. The acts of the parties confirm that the 
transaction was a sale rather than a mortgage. Such 
evidence, albeit not itself determinative, has nevertheless 
assisted courts in deciding whether a deed should be 
declared a mortgage. See, e.g., Thornley Land 
& Livestock Co. v. Gailex:, supra at 287. 
In this case, it is clear that Mr. Barnes' eyes were 
open when he executed the various documents in question. 
He admits to having read and understood the documents and 
acted free from any duress. (R.42:33) He also admits 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to having previously negotiated and entered into many other 
business transactions on a level comparable with this one. 
(R.42:36). 
Although Barnes claimed to have a bona fide offer 
to purchase from Prudential Fund, Barnes made no attempt 
to sell the property to Prudential when Sohio failed 
to match the offer within the thirty-day period. If the 
transaction were a mortgage and the note had been assigned 
to Sohio upon Barnes' default, as Barnes contends, Barnes 
could be expected to complete the sale to Prudential 
and pay off the note or redeem the property, as the 
case may be. More importantly, Barnes ignored the property 
for five years following the sale, while Sohio and the other 
working interest owners managed, operated, developed and pa~ 
the taxes on the property. (R.103) Although well aware of~ 
purchase and subsequent actions of Sohio consistent therewi~, 
Barnes made no objection or contrary claim for five years ~~ 
to this lawsuit. (R. 42: 81-84; 103). Now Barnes belatedly 
decides to reveal previously unknown intentions which are self 
serving and contrary to the language of the writings, sayi~ 
that he "did not catch the significance" of that language and 
that he "missed it" at the time he signed the agreements. 
(R. 42: 38-39). 
Sohio's actions have always been fully consistent 
with ownership. Sohio has never had any reason to treat the 
transaction as anything but a sale and has never done so. 
Since the purchase of Barnes' interest the property has 
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been managed by Sohio with some participation by the other 
owners, but with no participation by Barnes. (R. 103). 
without protest from Barnes, Sohio has conveyed sixty 
percent of the interest acquired from Barnes to its remaining 
partners, Tarinc, Inc., S.A. and City Investing Co., for 
sixty percent of the price Sohio paid for Barnes' interest. 
(R. 102; 106-107). Sohio has also entered into new 
arrangements for the development of the property (R. 102) and 
has paid taxes and assessed expenses to other partners, but not 
to Barnes. 
The circumstances of this case may be likened to those 
in Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra, where this 
court stated as follows, 
Defendant went into possession, 
received the rents from the 
property and paid the taxes 
and expenses incident to its 
operation. He made a sale of 
some of the property, apparently 
without protest from the plaintiff. 
This situation continued for approximately 
6 1/2 years from the time of the 
execution of the agreement, or 
approximately 5 1/2 years after the 
one year period to 'redeem' had 
expired, before plaintiff made 
any move at all with respect to 
the property or any obligation with 
regard thereto. No interest was 
paid during this period and the 
parties did nothing which would 
be inconsistent with the full 
ownership of the property in 
Gailey. Then for the first time 
Plaintiff makes claim that the 
deed absolute was in fact a 
mortgage. • .• Viewing the situation 
of the parties at the time and 
their conduct since that time, the 
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conclusion is inescapable that 
the agreement was intended to be a 
sale agreement with option to 
repurchase within one year. 
Furthermore, conduct of the parties 
from the time of execution of the 
deed until the time of filing of 
this action indicates that they considered 
the agreement an option to repurchase 
and not a mortgage. 
The undisputed fact of Barnes' subsequent inaction, 
together with the actions of Sohio and the terms of the 
documents themselves, indicate that the transaction was a 5~ 
and not a mortgage. 
III 
SINCE THERE WAS NO INDEBTEDNESS ON THE 
PART OF BARNES TO SOHIO, THE TRANSACTION 
CANNOT BE DEEMED TO BE A MORTGAGE. 
The most important factor in determining whether a 
deed absolute on its face is in reality a mortgage is the 
existence of an indebtedness on the part of the granter to the 
grantee, the payment of which is secured by the property. 
According to the authorities, the absence of such indebtedness 
demonstrates that the transaction was a sale. 
In determining whether an abolute 
conveyance is a mortgage, by far the 
most important fact is whether there 
is an indebtedness on the oart of 
the granter to the grantee, left 
unaffected by the conveyance. The 
debt may either have existed prior 
to the conveyance or have arisen from 
a loan made at the time of the 
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conveyance. The existence of such 
an indebtedness is considered as 
almost conclusive that the transaction 
was a mortgage. Even if it is 
legally possible to have a mortgage 
without a personal debt, its absence 
raises such a strong, natural inference 
in this sort of case that the transaction 
was a sale that it practically 
establishes the point. (Emphasis 
added) . 
IV American Law of Property 92 (1952 Ed.). 
In Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, supra, this court 
recognized that without a debtor-creditor relationship there 
could be no mortgage. There, the court, at 638, quoted with 
approval the following paragraph from Jones on Mortgages, (8th 
Ed.) 
The existence of the debt is the 
test. There must be a debt 
or there can be no security for 
its payment. Hence, it is said 
if there is no debt there can be 
no mortgage. 
See also Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey, 
supra at 287 (Utah 1943); Smyth v. Reed, supra at 479. 
Appellant claims that the deed was a mortgage to the 
Bank to secure the payment of the $500,000 promissory 
note executed by Barnes in favor of the Bank. Such a 
claim ignores the fact that the grantee under the deed was 
Sohio, not the Bank. The Bank could never have foreclosed 
on the property upon the failure of either Barnes or Sohio 
to pay the note. Therefore, the deed was not security for 
the Bank. As explicitly stated in the Escrow Agreement, 
the security relied upon by the Bank to make the loan was 
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the commitment of Sohio to buy out Barnes, the proceeds 
to go to the Bank. Barnes and Sohio owed one another 
nothing. Indeed, Barnes has never even claimed any 
indebtedness between it and Sohio. The essential element 
of an indebtedness on the part of Barnes to Sohio is 
lacking and without it there can be no mortgage. 
IV. 
SINCE THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR REDEMPTION, THE 
TRANSACTION BETWEEN BARNES AND SOHIO IS A SALE. 
In Gibbons v. Gibbons, supra at 107, this Court stated: 
The right of defeasance of the title conveyed 
that is the right to redeem the property, is, 
essential element of a mortgage. Without the 
right to redeem the property, the deed cannot 
intended as a mortgage. Such right is not 
conclusive that a mortgage was intended; but 
without the right there can be no mortgage. 
See also Hallstrom v. Buhler, 378 P.2d 355, 357 (Utah 1963) 
where the court held that the transaction was a sale, and n 
loan "because no right was given to the sellers to regain t 
property sold. • " 
No language in the letter agreement or the Escrow 
Agreement would permit redemption of Sohio's title. Once 
Barnes defaulted on the note and Sohio paid $500,000, the s 
was completed and the deed belonged to Sohio. Barnes has n 
claimed that the transaction contemplated a right of 
redemption. The absence of any right of redemption by Barr 
evidences as a matter of law that the transaction between t 
parties was not a mortgage. 
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v. 
EVEN IF THE DEED COULD BE CONSTRUED 
TO BE A MORTGAGE, THE PRESENT ACTION 
IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
It is clear that the doctrine of laches is applicable to a 
suit to have a deed absolute on its face declared a mortgage. 
Since the appellant is alleging an equitable doctrine to 
declare a deed absolute on its face to be a mortgage, the 
equitable defense of laches is available to Sohio. In 55 ~ 
~' Mortgages, § 37, pp. 218-19, the following is stated: 
Since it is only by the intervention 
of equity that a deed absolute on 
its face may be declared a 
mortgage, the rule obtains generally 
that equitable principles as to 
laches and stale demands are 
applicable to a suit to secure such relief. 
There is, however, no fixed rule by which 
to determine when there is laches 
sufficient to constitute a defense. 
Each case is determined according 
to its own peculiar circumstances. 
Although a mere delay short of 
the period established by the 
statute of limitations does not of 
itself raise the presumption 
of laches, it has been held that 
relief may be refused in the case 
of a stale demand independent of 
the period fixed by the statute 
of limitations, and this is 
particularly true where the relations 
of the parties have been altered 
in the meantime. 
The Utah Supreme Court relied upon the doctrine of 
laches to refuse to construe a deed as a mortgage in the case 
of Jacobson v. Jacobson, supra. In Jacobson, the plaintiffs 
filed suit to quiet title to property alleging that a deed 
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executed in favor of the defendants was an equitable mortg~e 
The deed had been given to the defendants when they provid~ 
funds needed by the plaintiffs to pay off a debt on the 
property. Following the deeding of the property to the 
defendants in 1966, the defendants paid taxes, maintained the 
premises, harvested crops, and sold some of the property. It 
also appeared that until the action was filed, the plaintiffs 
did not believe that they owned the property in question. As 
consequence, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows, at 
158-59: 
Supplementing what has been said 
above, there is also to be 
considered the doctrine of laches. 
That is, that a court of equity is 
reluctant to reward a party who has 
been dilatory in seeking his remedy. 
As is sometimes said, equity aids 
the vigilant. The requirement 
that laches must involve a delay; and 
also that because of the delay there 
has resulted some disadvantage to the 
other party, is met here. In addition 
to the delay of eight years in bringing 
this suit, circumstances have intervened 
so that the delay has indeed placed 
the defendants at a substantial disadvantage. 
The father .•. has now passed away, so 
his testimony as to his version of the 
transaction is no longer available. 
It is also shown that the property 
greatly increased in value; and that 
a portion of it has been conveyed to a 
third party. 
In the instant case, there has been a delay of five (5) years. 
The property has increased in value, portions of it have been 
sold and at least one person present at the time the documen~ 
in question were executed is deceased. (R. 101), Furthermore 
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the nature of some of the properties, being unpatented mining 
claims, requires constant vigilance on the part of an owner. 
Where Barnes, a self-professed experienced and knowledgeable 
oil lease operator, did nothing for five years which would be 
inconsistent with Sohio's full ownership of the property and 
where Sohio has so significantly altered its position in the 
meantime, appellant's complaint should be dismissed as barred 
by the doctrine of laches. 
VI. 
THE CASES CITED BY BARNES DO NOT SUPPORT THE 
PRESENCE OF TRIABLE FACTS OR THE EXISTENCE OF A 
MORTGAGE IN THIS CASE. 
Barnes has cited certain cases in which courts 
received parole evidence in determining whether a deed absolute 
on its face should be interpreted, instead, as a mortgage. 
However, these cases do not require such a factual inquiry 
where, as in the present case, the deed is accompanied by 
contemporaneous writings exhibiting the intentions of the 
parties. Parole evidence may be allowed on occasion in 
examining the intentions of the parties to a bare deed, but not 
to vary the terms of a written contract which accompanies a 
deed. Barnes is attempting to do the latter here. See ~, 
Brown v. Skeen, 58 P.2d 24, 32 (Utah 1956). Furthermore, such 
evidence is immaterial where the necessary elements of a 
mortgage are lacking anyway. 
Barnes' description of the opinion in Duerden v. 
Solomon, 94 P. 978 (Utah 1908), is misleading. It is true that 
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the court held that courts of equity will look beyond the ter, 
of a bare deed to determine whether there is clear and 
convincing proof that a mortgage was the object of the partie:' 
in executing and receiving the deed. However, there was no 
dispute in that case that an indebtedness existed between the 
parties and that the deed had been given to secure payment o!' 
the indebtedness. 94 P. at 979. This essential element is 
lacking in the present case. Barnes does not even contend tha: 
there was, or is, any indebtedness between Barnes and Sohio. 
Barnes was indebted to the Bank and the security for that 
indebtedness was Barnes' note together with Sohio's promise to 
buy the property and pay off the note in case of Barnes' 
default. 
Furthermore, there was no other writing to look to in 
Duerden to ascertain the intentions of the parties. In the 
present case there are two contemporaneous written agreements.' 
It was the content of these writings upon which Judge Ballif 
relied in his ruling below. No court is as free to examine 
parole evidence where a written agreement accompanies a deed, 
as where there is no such additional writing. 
Finally, the receipts and book entries mentioned in 
Duerden were not only parole evidence, but were also the 
defendant- mortgagee's own records showing the plaintiff's 
payments as loan interest, rather than rental payments. They 
were thus, in effect, admissions by the defendant that the deed 
was a mortgage to secure repayment of a loan. In the present 
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case Sohio has received no payments from Barnes at all and to 
the extent Sohio's records reflect the nature of the 
transaction at all, they show it to be a purchase. (R. 100-102) 
Hess v. Anger 177 P. 232 (Utah 1918), also cited by 
Barnes, is entirely inapposi te. In Hess there was "no 
contention . . but that the deed was intended as a 
mortgage" by both parties pursuant to an oral agreement. Id. 
at 233. The sole dispute was as to the "nature and extent of 
the indebtedness the deed was given to secure." Id. In the 
present case there is no allegation of a parole contract, nor 
any indebtedness and ~ has no relevancy. 
In Corey v. Roberts, supra, relied upon heavily by 
Barnes, the court at the outset distinquished that case from 
the present situation by holding that in a case such as this it 
is essential to determine 
[w]hether or not there was a continuing 
obligation on the part of the granter to pay the 
debt or meet the obligation which it is claimed 
the deed was made to secure • • . 
Here there was no debt, hence there was no continuing 
obligation. 
In Corey the court held that a transaction involving a deed 
was actually a mortgage relationship because: (1) There was a 
pre-existing debt which was not extinguished by the deed; 
(2)The grantee paid nothing for the deed; (3) The granter 
remained in possession after the conveyance vested and retained 
all the indicia of ownership; (4) The granter had a right to 
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redeem or "repurchase" the property; (5) Neither party 
actually maintained that the deed was absolute, although it 
purported to be such on its face; 
and (6) Income received on the property was applied by the 
grantee to the grantor's loan account. 
It is undisputed that none of these factors is presen'.1 
in the instant suit. Furthermore, there are contemporaneous 
writings in this case, whereas there were none in Corey. 
Therefore, Corey is good law on what constitutes a mortgage, 
but is factually opposite to this case. 
Brown v. Skeen, supra, is another case which is 
factually self-distinguishing. In Brown the court held that a 
deed and written declaration of trust, construed together, 
constituted a trust deed allowing a right of redemption and 
having the same effect as a mortgage. 
In the present case it is undisputed that the 
contemporaneous agreements contain language denoting a sale, 
rather than a declaration of trust or mortgage. 
It is also important to note that Brown stands for th< 
view that where contemporaneous written instruments accompany; 
deed, the original intent of the parties with respect to the 
deed may be ascertained through reference to such instrumenu, 
and extrinsic evidence will not be allowed to vary the ter~~ 
the instruments. Thus Barnes is attempting to do precisely 
that which is prohibited Nevertheless, Sohio contends that 
even assuming the truth of Barnes' extrinsic factual 
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assertions, there still is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the case was properly decided as a matter of law. See 
Point II C, supra. 
According to Barnes the decision in Thornley Land and 
Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra, turned on a finding that it was 
not "clear from the terms of the agreement whether or not there 
was an obligation from plaintiff to defendant ••• existing 
after the execution of the agreement." Id. at 287, Barnes 
brief on appeal, p. 13. It is undisputed in this case that 
there was no such obligation either before or after the 
agreement, hence there has never been a mortgage. It should 
also be noted that in Thornley the court held that the 
transaction was a sale. 
Barnes erroneously states that in Gibbons v. Gibbons, 
supra, the court held the transaction to be a mortgage. The 
contrary is true, Id. at 108. More importantly, the first 
thing that Gibbons teaches is that where a written contract 
accompanies a deed, the question whether the deed was intended 
by the parties to be part of a sale or a mortgage is one to be 
decided as a matter of law by reference to the contract. Id. 
at 106. Since the recitals in the Gibbons contract 
demonstrated (1) the absence of an indebtedness secured by the 
deed {the deed was given to discharge an indebtedness, rather 
than to secure one); (2) that the conveyance was to be 
absolute; (3) a reservation of a life estate by the granter; 
and (4) a right of sale in the grantee, the transaction was 
held to be a sale. 
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Each of these elements is also present in this ca Se, 
With particular reference to factor (3), although no life 
estate was reserved by Barnes, Barnes did reserve his interest i 
during the term of the note. Once the note expired without 
payment, the sale of Barnes' interest took effect. From that I 
time forward Sohio enjoyed full ownership, including the right I 
to sell, and in fact did sell portions of Barnes' former 
interest to other parties. 
In its discussion of Gibbons it is clear that Barnes 
has confused the parties, and perhaps the cases as well. 
Barnes seems to argue that the court held the tr ans act ion to be 
a mortgage because the contract gave the granter a right to i 
! 
sell the property to a third party. Actually, the court found I 
that the agreement "did not recognize a right of sale in the 
granter." On the contrary, the contract gave the grantee a 
right of sale and the court held the transaction was a 
conveyance. 
Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972) is a case in 
which the subject property was heavily mortgaged and the 
mortgagor (plaintiff) had defaulted on his obligation and ws 
about to lose his land. In urgent need of money, the plaintiff' 
was referred to defendants and an agreement was prepared 
contemporaneous to the deed, whereby (1) the grantees agreed to 
advance the money; (2) the grantees agreed to reconvey to the 
granter upon repayment of the indebtedness; and (3) the 
granter retained the right to sell the property to a third 
party. Inasmuch as these factors pointed clearly to a 
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: ' 
mortgage, the court remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of whether the transaction was one actually 
intended to disguise a usurious loan. If so, the borrower 
would have been entitled to the penalty provided under Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-7. 2 
There is no dispute that the mortgage elements mentioned in 
Kjar are lacking in the present case. Rather than making out a 
mortgage, the contemporaneous written agreements in this case 
make out a sale. 
Finally, Hallstrom v. Buhler, 378 P.2d 355 (Utah 1963), 
cited by the court in Kjar, is of interest because it held a 
transaction to be a sale, rather than a loan, in the face of a 
claim that the value of the property far exceeded the alleged 
indebtedness (or, as the court stated, the purchase price). 
This court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the buyers 
because 
Id. at 357. 
[t]he only reasonable interpretation of the 
transaction as evidenced by the written 
documents, pleadings and pre-trial order based on 
the discussion between the court and counsel was 
that it was a sale and not a loan. This is so 
because no right was given to the sellers to 
regain the property sold upon payment of any 
given amount .•.. 
2 The procedural posture of the case on appeal is not 
entirely clear, which leaves uncertain the exact purpose of the 
remand. All parties apparently agreed that material questions 
of fact existed which rendered the trial court's summary 
judgment inappropriate. The nature of these factual issues is 
not clear from the opinion. On appeal the defendants-
respondents merely asserted that the cour~ nonetheles~ did not 
abuse its discretion in granting summary JUdgment. K1ar v. 
Briml~, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972), at 24. 
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Since there was no provision in this case for 
redemption by Barnes once the sale occurred, the transaction 
between Barnes and Sohio likewise cannot be considered a lo an, 
regardless of the considerations raised by Barnes on this 
appeal. 
Although the law in the cases cited by Barnes does 
apply in the present case insofar as there is an identity of 
facts, that law supports Sohio's legal position, rather than 
Barnes'. The cases cited by Barnes which (1) interpret a 
transaction as a mortgage; or (2) permit an inquiry into 
extrinsic facts, are distinguishable on their facts. In the 
former cases there was an indebtedness, a right of redemption 
and, in some of the cases, a contemporaneous writing (or oral 
agreement) which constituted a mortgage. In the latter cases 
there was an absence of any written or oral agreement between 
the parties other than the deed. Here there are written 
agreements evincing a sale and the absene of any elements of a 
mortgage transaction and the lower court so held. 
CONCLUSION 
There never was any indebtedness between the parties in 
this case and Barnes had no right of redemption after the sa~ 
took effect. The absence of these elements is conclusive ~ocl 
that there was no mortgage. The agreements between the 
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parties, together with the deed, demonstrate an intent by both 
parties to enter into a sale. What Mr. Barnes now says his 
intentions were may not be allowed to vary the writings. The 
questions raised by Barnes in this case are immaterial in the 
absence of the fundamental elements of a mortgage. 
This court should affirm the summary judgment granted by 
the district court. There is no genuine issue of material fact 
in this case and the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of Sohio. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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